by Nona Willis Aronowitz

In November 2006, mere weeks after the death of my mother, radical feminist and journalist Ellen Willis, my friend Emma Bee Bernstein and I found ourselves contemplating what feminism meant to us. We were just 22, and we felt that the legacy of feminism was slipping through our fingers and that our generation needed to define this word, this concept, this feeling for ourselves.

So we did what any sensible young women would do: We hit the road. For several months, through dozens of cities, we drove across the United States in a Chevy Cavalier, photographing young women and finding out what was important to them. We talked with women as diverse as a burlesque dancer, a future nun, an air force worker, a 16-year-old pop star hopeful and a bartender on welfare.

What we discovered is that there is no feminist “movement” anymore—and that’s not a bad thing. Whether it comes from a progressive non-profit in Uganda, a tiny grassroots group in Lake Andes, North Dakota, or a single working mother in Mexico City, today’s feminism works better less as a movement and more as a pervading cultural force. Our generation isn’t interested in labels, in binding together over a few common issues and following the lead of a few faces of feminism—the kind of thing that made women feel marginalized in the first place. It happened during the Second Wave, when most of the feminists in the spotlight were educated, middle-class white women in big cities. It happened in the Third Wave, when both real and manufactured generational divides crippled the movement. And it still happens now, when certain bloggers or issues are privileged over others by the mass media.

So do we still even need the word “feminism”? Absolutely. Feminism still has the power to ignite a gender awareness, hearkening back to that old-fashioned but very much alive concept of “consciousness-raising.” The word may no longer be necessary to label our generation’s hardworking activists. As one race activist in New Orleans told us, “Who cares? Just do the work!” But destigmatizing feminism is essential in a less tangible way. Not only does it make young women cognizant of issues relating to gender equality and justice, but it also encourages them to consistently talk about these issues. Our generation of feminists don’t have one-track minds—our ideas about race, class, sex, politics and everything else are all channeled through the prism of feminism. It’s an amorphous, intersectional prism that’s making real political change.

Whether they feel empowered, discouraged, enraged or mobilized, young women have strong opinions about what they want to see happen in the future. And no matter whether you agree with or identify with it, the concept of “feminism” starts these ideas flowing. It acts as a code word to bring to light gender issues. It keeps us on a continuum of history. If a word can do all that, then it’s sure as hell worth fighting for.

Nona Willis Aronowitz is the co-author of Girldrive: Criss-crossing America, Redefining Feminism. She is a reporter at Chicago Tribune’s Triblocal.com, and she also blogs at www.girl-drive.com.

The impact of the global financial crisis creates an illusion that there are real prospects for effective co-operation to reach long-term global goals. Despite China’s immaculate hosting of the Olympic Games and its inevitable rise to the global negotiation tables as a key decision-maker, reality forces her to come to terms with her own pressing issues such as maintaining an eight percent growth rate and increasing domestic consumption. Inasmuch as the Chinese government wants a louder voice in the global regimes, shouldering responsibility is not on the agenda.

The resulting accord of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reflects what global, negotiated governance for co-operative action to reach long-term global goals entails. The Convention demonstrates typical barriers and complexities of building any form of global regime. What determines the pace of the negotiation process and the speed of reaching agreement is the immediacy of dangers in question. Even where dangers are immediate, politics is politics. The result of the two-week convention of leaders from 192 members is a reality check that environmental dangers are still not immediate enough to create any binding deal that obliges member states to contribute meaningfully. Anyone who expects more than this is just unrealistic.

At the end of the Copenhagen summit, there is no consensus, no shared vision for long-term co-operative action, including on emission reductions. In the words of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the accord is a “beginning”—a start at building a foundation for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate change; a start that can last a long time.

The ratified Convention recognized that the climate system is a shared resource whose stability can be affected by industrial and other emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Under the Convention, governments are only expected to:

* gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, national policies and best practices;
* launch national strategies for addressing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to expected impacts, including the provision of financial and technological support to developing countries;
* co-operate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.

The delegates passed a motion to “take note” of a deal that has no binding effect; an accord that lacked specific targets for reducing carbon emissions. Don’t forget that the Convention was set up to build the necessary framework to clarify what these targets are, as well as how and when these targets can be met. There has still been no real negotiation on targets for developed nations. Sessions have been held, yes, but all developed countries set their own targets before they arrived and stuck to them.

The attitude and the lack of sincerity of the leaders of China and the United States—the world’s two biggest greenhouse emitters, responsible for 40 percent of world emissions—were telling. They flew in at the end of the two-week convention, making it clear that they had nothing fair, effective and binding to offer. Their entourages just took over the agenda and emerged with what was basically their own private deal, announced on live television before others realized it had happened.

Under the confines of the UNFCCC, the so-called accord is an official recognition that there is the need to limit global temperatures rising no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. There is money pledged and a fund created. However, how predictable and sustainable are these financial resources remain somewhat murky as developed countries agree to “set a goal of mobilising jointly $100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.” The lesson here is that an accord based on a proposal tabled by a U.S.-led group of China, India, Brazil and South Africa is not global. The year 2009 is a mere essential beginning for any co-operative action to reach long-term global goals.

The Economist’s recent special report on Brazil emphasized the country’s remarkable achievements in the last decade and applauded what it deemed its “take-off.” The magazine’s political leanings were evident in its reluctance to give proper credit to the leftist Lula da Silva government, choosing instead to describe Lula as a lucky leader who had benefited from difficult decisions made by his predecessor, the more centrist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and from the commodity boom.

In the same issue The Economist profiles Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s chief of staff and the likely presidential candidate of his party, the Workers’ Party (PT). In the article titled “Her Master’s Voice” The Economist questions whether Rousseff is anything else than Lula’s dutiful pupil and also, despite the Lula government’s high approval ratings (north of 80 percent quoted), the fact that she would be able to build a successful campaign on stressing continuity.

Rousseff was not her party’s obvious candidate and is not as well known as other PT leaders. Her candidacy only became a possibility after Lula’s closest associates were tarnished by a Congressional vote buying scandal in 2005, the so-called Mensalão scandal. But Dilma Rousseff–an activist since the 1960s, a political prisoner under the dictatorship from 1970 until 1973, a two term secretary of energy of the Rio Grande do Sul state after the return to democracy and the country’s former secretary of energy- deserves better than being branded as the alleged “voice of her master.” In this Q&A, Doctor Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga, professor at the Universidade Federal de São Carlos and a visiting researcher at the University of Oxford talks about Rousseff’s prospects in Brazil’s presidential contest next October.

WAFP: What are the personal assets and liabilities that Rousseff would bring into the competition?

MSSB: Dilma brings administrative and managerial experience in an area [energy] that is very important for the country. She has a political past that involved participating in the struggle for democracy, and she was a political prisoner. She is a woman, and women are currently gaining more and more representation in the political arena in Brazil. They also make up more than half of the electorate. Moreover, Dilma herself comes from the upper middle class, so not only does she know this sector of the electorate but she also stands to benefit from the electorate’s aspirational drive. However, on the negative side, Dilma has no experience in electoral contests, and there is a sense that she lacks charisma. She has not held any elected position nor has she been a member of Congress. Neither is Dilma an organic candidate of her party as she is a comparatively new member of the PT, which she joined in 2000 after an internal dispute in the Democratic Labour Party [center-left]. Though the PT’s president is closely associated with Lula and with herself, she would also have to deal with the PT leaders involved in the scandals who will continue to have an influence within the party. The PT militants themselves are divided with respect to her candidacy.

WAFP: Lula enjoys very high approval ratings but an incumbent’s high approval ratings do not always help a candidate of his party as we are witnessing in Chile with Michelle Bachelet and Eduardo Frei. Will Lula’s popularity help Rousseff’s campaign?

MSSB: I think it will help a lot. Lula’s popularity will be key in Dilma having more support among popular sectors. Lula is Dilma’s mentor and her main supporter not just because she has credentials that are important in the Brazilian political context where this type of candidate (with technocratic credentials) is still preferred by many voters. Lula has been campaigning for her quite openly, and she has been increasing her share in the polls that measure voters’ intentions. I think she will be the PT’s candidate.

WAFP: Is Rousseff the candidate of continuity? What would make her administration different from Lula’s?

MSSB: Dilma would be the candidate of continuity of an administration that has maintained economic stability. She would also keep alternative energies programs and in this area there could be some innovations as she would be bringing a lot of experience. This could have not only a domestic but also an international impact. She would also maintain the main social programs, particularly Bolsa Família [The Lula government’s welfare program that provides financial aid to poor families on the condition that the children attend school and are vaccinated], the great challenge would be to find a way out for millions of poor families that live below the poverty line and that are dependent on the government for food and minimum well-being. The infrastructure projects associated with the PAC [Program of Growth Acceleration] would go on too as they are a banner for the current government. A lot of additional investment would be needed for those projects.

WAFP: If elected Rousseff would be Brazil’s first woman president. What would this mean for the country?

MSSB: If Dilma got elected this would be a very crucial event in Brazil.
Given the chauvinistic tradition in Brazilian politics, Dilma’s arrival to the presidency would have a profound effect on power, gender and social relations. It would contribute to higher self-esteem among Brazilian women, leading them to see themselves as capable of competing for any professional or political position with Brazilian men.